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ABSTRACT
A certain objection to the view that colonialism is and was morally problem-
atic is that it has introduced more benefits than harms to the populations that have 
undergone it. This article sets aside the empirical question - that is, of interrogating 
whether colonialism did bring more benefits than harms; instead, it argues that his-
torical instances of colonialism were wrong even if they had in fact brought net-pos-
itive aggregate consequences to the colonised populations. In arguing this, I develop 
and substantiate a new concept of relational injustice in describing the unique nature 
of inegalitarian, subjugative relationship defining the interaction between perpetra-
tors and victims in colonialism. Given that moral relations cannot be reduced into 
the welfare of their respective individual agents, it is hence the case that inciden-
tal, unintended gains in individual welfare neither adequately compensate for nor 
at all rectify the initial relational injustice. There are three objections that are dis-
cussed and rejected, such as: i) the purported irrationality in individuals regretting 
events that left them better-off on aggregate, ii) individuals can opt to waive being 
in just and equal relations with others in exchange for individual gains, and iii) the 
advanced account is self-defeating, because it nullifies the possibility for adequate 
compensation.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent debates over the legacy of colonialism—such as that of the British 
Empire—have often been centered around whether members of colonies have, on 
balance, benefited from being subject to colonial rule. Such debates are not only epis-
temically challenging, since they require speculation about how things would have 
turned out in the absence of colonialism; they also neglect the possibility that colo-
nial projects could have been wrong independent of the harms they bring.
My thesis is that the relational injustice perpetuated under colonialism enacted 
unoffset wrongs, such that colonialism was wrong even in cases where it introduced 
counterfactual-comparative benefits. I will first discuss my concept of relational in-
justice, prior to establishing the empirical premise and explaining why such wrongs 
are unoffset by consequentialist gains.
Harm is often employed in a counterfactual-comparative manner: A’s treatment 
of B harms B if and only if B has lower welfare in the world in which that treatment 
occurs than in the closest possible world without that treatment. I propose, however, 
that B can be wronged by A’s treatment even when no such counterfactual-compar-
ative harm occurs. On the understanding of wronging that I adopt, A’s treatment of 
B wrongs B if and only if B is justified in holding resentful reactive attitudes towards 
A in relation to that treatment (Strawson, 1974). I say that there is unoffset wrongness 
in A’s treatment of B when it is reasonable for B to hold negative reactive attitudes 
towards A in relation to A’s treatment of B even though this treatment did not harm 
B in the counterfactual-comparative sense; B is not worse off—and may in fact be 
better off—with the treatment than in the closest possible world without it.
I hereby propose a new concept of ‘relational injustice’, which refers to the spe-
cific injustice perpetuated when an individual is placed in an unjustifiably lower 
status in relation to another within a relationship. Anderson (1999) discusses the 
concept of relational inequality, which involves status disparities that prevent in-
dividuals from relating to each other as equals within communities. Relational in-
justice is a particular form of inequality, which involves two additional features: i) 
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a group characteristic-based form of prejudice1 towards particular demographic groups 
that is ii) institutionalised through formal structures, such as government or the civil service. 
At its very core, relational injustice measures the quality of relationships between in-
dividuals. Relational injustice differs from distributive injustice, in that its manifesta-
tions—biases, psychological exclusion, and imposed deprecation of status—cannot 
be rectified even in a society where individuals have equal levels of welfare, or access 
to welfare.
EMPIRICAL PREMISE
Consider now the specific empirical premise, that colonialism did involve a vio-
lation of relational equality, and thus constitutes empirically an event of relational 
injustice. The significance of this section is as follows: if it can be established that 
relational injustice has been committed under colonialism, then it follows that colo-
nial projects can be wrongful even if not harmful. Whilst African slavery had existed 
prior to European colonisation, the process of Western colonisation was embedded 
within large-scale Transatlantic Slavery that led to the non-consensual and dehu-
manising transfer of 11 million Africans to the Caribbean and Americas (King, 2010, 
pg.24). Colonies were governed by structures beholden (by definition) to either their 
original sovereign state (e.g. the UK, Spain, or France), or a newly emerged substi-
tute (e.g. the US, Rhodesia); the colonised public in these areas were systematically 
ascribed a lower status than a select group of elites (Belich, 2009, p. 573). Moreover, 
indigenous populations faced psychological exploitation (from being forced to inter-
nalise racialised and deeply bigoted tropes about themselves, to navigating coerced 
family breakups and emotional torment and humiliation at hands of violent invad-
ers) and social exclusion from elites who entrenched foreign interests and designated 
them the effective ‘Other’ in governance (Fanon, 1961). The apparent caveat is that 
not all colonial projects exemplified these phenomena equally, if at all; yet to the 
extent that they did, they were relationally unjust.
1.  Taken here to be denoting a negative or discriminatory judgment with harmful effects; for 
more on this, see Fricker (2007).
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RELATIONAL INJUSTICE AND WRONGNESS
Why is relational injustice typically wrongful? My view is that there is something 
intrinsically valuable in equal relations between persons within a particular society. 
Suppose we remove all specifications of characteristics and features about individu-
als within a hypothetical society, and are asked to choose between a world where all 
relations are deeply egalitarian and grounded upon mutual respect and compassion, 
and a world where all relations are inegalitarian, with a clearly arranged status order 
and hierarchy. Now suppose that both societies have achieved the same, optimal state 
from the point of view of distributive justice. We would intuitively find the former 
more appealing. I suggest that this is because relational equality is good in itself.
A critic would rightly observe that our intuitions here are underdetermining—
it is not clear if we find the unequal world less appealing because of the impersonal 
value we find in relational equality, or because of the wrongfulness in unequal relations. I 
suggest that we need not pick either of them—we could find the unequal world less ap-
pealing due to both impersonal value-centric and wrongfulness-centric considerations.
So why does such injustice wrong a particular individual, independent of spe-
cific impacts on their individual welfare? Could an individual be wronged in such a 
way that cannot be reduced to a loss of welfare? A potential justification is to view 
relational equality as the component of a universal claim-right held by all people—all 
individuals are entitled to being treated equally in their relations, independent of 
the outcomes associated with such treatment. The placement of an individual within 
a network of relations that treats them as if they were unequal violates their funda-
mental claim to being treated as a moral and social equal, given their possession of 
the prerequisite conditions that render them morally respectable agents: the ability 
to reason and (self)-consciousness. For more on this argument, see Jonathan Wolff 
(1998).
This proposition appears to also ground our common intuitions concerning 
why discrimination along arbitrary lines—even if it does not harm the individual—is 
intrinsically wrongful.
The potential challenge to my claim flagged above is that we find discrimina-
tion to be impersonally bad, as opposed to intrinsically wrongful for any particular 
individuals—i.e. it is a bad state of affairs irrespective of (and indeed, independent 
of) whether any individual’s welfare is set back by discrimination. We may find this 
notion attractive, in that it retains both the intuitive observation that the individuals 
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were indeed better off under discrimination, whilst also allowing us to condemn such 
discrimination.
Yet I find this rejoinder puzzling. We rarely appeal to the notion of ‘impersonal 
bad’ when explaining why the existence of discrimination is undesirable; instead, 
we intuit that there is something person-specific about the wrongness at stake—it is a 
particular individual who is being discriminated against, and thus our intuitive un-
easiness stems from the individual’s experience and treatment, as opposed to a mys-
terious impersonal property. Whilst discrimination does not necessarily constitute 
an instance of relational injustice, both discrimination and relational injustice share 
the same ‘wrong-making’ feature—that is, the failure to treat individuals as moral or 
social equals, in the absence of normatively valid explanations.
The onus lies in establishing why the wrongfulness involved in relational in-
justice cannot be offset by aggregate welfare gains accrued to individuals. Consider 
the following example, which is similar to the one discussed by Woodward (1986): 
the Discriminated Homeless Person. A homeless individual is denied entry into a 
homeless shelter from the freezing weather outside, by an explicitly racist manager of 
the shelter; the shelter later collapses, killing everyone inside. From a counterfactual-
comparative point of view, it appears that the homeless individual, whilst suffering 
from hypothermia, was indeed made better off by the initial denial of entry (which 
prevented their death).2 However, there remains an intuition that the homeless person 
has suffered relational injustice at the hands of a formal structure (the shelter) on the 
basis of some group characteristic (their ethnicity). In other words, they are wronged 
without being net-harmed on balance.
There are two primary strands of arguments in favour of the view that the 
wrongs (in both cases of colonialism and the Homeless), are not cancellable by offset-
ting welfare gains. Firstly, there is the argument from non-fungibility: every relation 
maps onto a correlation between two individuals—e.g. the coloniser and the colo-
nised, the shelter manager and the homeless. Whilst redistribution of money, goods, 
or opportunities might have compensated the colonised’s individual welfare, it did 
not rectify the imbalances that had previously persisted (and continued to persist) in 
spite of the economic advances and technological innovation introduced under co-
2.  Assuming, of course, that their existence is utility-positive.
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lonial rule3. We intrinsically feel that there are certain items that money cannot buy 
(See Sandel, 2012)—for instance, relational attributes such as genuine love, compassion, 
or dignity and respect by other individuals. These are dimensions that exist independent-
ly of material benefits or individual welfare, in that they necessarily involve interac-
tions between two or more individuals (e.g. it is unintelligible to discuss acquiring 
love without another person to love you). Therefore, assuming that such improve-
ments to welfare did not (as per empirics) improve the relational parity between the 
colonised and colonisers, mere material improvements do not suffice in compensat-
ing for the previous wrongs.
Secondly, there is the argument from intentions. Many of colonial states’ greatest 
advances were unintended side benefits of projects primarily installed to generate 
revenue for the purpose of the colonisers. As such, material gains to the colonised 
were often the result of fortune and unintentionally favourable policies; even if this 
were not the case—as per certain colonies that acquired special economic status, such 
as Hong Kong and Singapore—the primary end objective of beneficiary economic 
policies remained ultimately the entrenchment of the colonisers’ interests. Consider 
the Saviour Burglar: a burglar breaks into a house with a malfunctioning microwave, 
and wakes up the sleeping houseowner in the process; the burglar steals $1,000 from 
the owner, but effectively saves the resident as they would have perished had the 
microwave later exploded. Now consider the Selfish Coach: the coach of a prodigy 
athlete views their success as the only means to accumulate substantial wealth and 
fame. As such, they sustain a relationally unequal relationship that nonetheless suc-
ceeds in training the athlete into becoming highly successful. The athlete would not 
have been as famous or well off had it not been for the unequal relations between 
them and their coach. In the case of the Selfish Coach, the benefits to the victim were 
accrued as a side benefit; in the case of the Saviour Burglar, the benefits were acciden-
tal and unintended. This is important, for whilst these benefits accrue to the victims 
in both cases above, in neither of the cases are they relevant to the particular rela-
tion between the individuals—the coach and the student, the burglar and the home-
owner: the student’s success derives from their interaction with and recognition by 
external sporting organisations and other competitors; the counterfactual harm that 
the burglar ‘helps’ the homeowner avoid is originally caused by the homeowner’s mi-
3.  Even for ‘successful’ colonies such as Hong Kong and Singapore, the public continued to re-
side under governance systems that were led and controlled predominantly by British civil servants; 
in British colonies in West and South Africa, many economic and social privileges were restricted 
solely to white residents.
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crowave malfunctioning, as opposed to the burglar. The absence of active intentions to 
compensate renders the comparative benefits accidental, as opposed to being morally 
relevant and legitimate as a form of compensation. In both cases, we feel that the 
coach and the burglar have wronged the athlete and homeowner—in spite of the net 
benefits their actions brought.
Note here that I am not making the strong claim that relational injustice can 
never be commensurable with any forms of compensation (although this strong claim 
does sit well with some of our intuitions concerning the irreparability or non-com-
pensatability of certain relation-specific goods—e.g. a particular romantic relation-
ship, or a unique friendship between two friends); instead, I am merely making the 
claim that in the context of colonialism, the wrongs of colonialism have not been 
offset by the accidental and non-commensurate benefits that colonialism has brought.
Wertheimer (2008) discusses a distinction between harmful exploitation and 
mutually advantageous exploitation—the former denotes instances where exploita-
tion is clearly harmful for the exploitee; whereas with the latter, he refers to instances 
where exploitation is uniquely Pareto Superior, that it allegedly leaves all parties—in-
cluding both exploitees and exploiters—better off. Imagine a modified version of the 
Homeless case, where the manager survives the crash and receives a one-off payment 
that rewards him for his discriminatory behaviour, whereas the discriminated home-
less man is (evidently) better off, having survived the crash by not being in the shelter.
My account offers critics of mutually advantageous exploitation with the neces-
sary explanatory currency to explain why the homeless person is still wronged—the 
inherently unacceptable nature of how the homeless person is treated relationally is 
non-fungible with incidental material gains, and, perhaps more pertinently in this case, 
there exists no intention on behalf of the manager to rescue the homeless person, 
which suggests that it would be unreasonably generous to the manager to credit to 
him the incidental benefits the homeless person receives.
OBJECTION I: EXCEPTIONAL CONDITIONS
A primary objection to the above is the view that it is reasonable and rational 
for individuals to want to opt to waive relational equality in exchange for greater 
material benefits in certain cases. For instance, I may consent to selling myself into 
being a servant or junior assistant to someone (lower status within a relationship) in 
exchange for large volumes of money; alternatively, I may accept being sexualised 
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under oppressive patriarchal norms in exchange for financial security. These scenar-
ios present apparent cases where, if there exists sufficient payoff, relational injustice 
is arguably not wrongful.
More specifically, this objection could take two forms: i) exception by consent—
where, if I consent voluntarily and autonomously to accepting relational injustice 
under some circumstances C1, such injustice no longer wrongs me; ii) exception by ra-
tionality—where, if it is rational for me to accept relational injustice under some cir-
cumstances C2, such injustice no longer wrongs me. Applying i) to the question at 
hand, it could be reasoned that colonised individuals might not have been wronged 
if they had consented voluntarily and autonomously to their relational injustice; ii) 
would imply that if it had been rational for the colonised to accept their injustice in 
exchange for the greater material benefits, they would not have been wronged by the 
injustice.
Neither version of the objection is fully successful. Notwithstanding such, 
whilst i) is empirically erroneous, ii), it must be conceded, is partially valid, but with 
some notable caveats.
In response to i), note that valid consent from the colonised—even if in exchange 
for material benefits—was largely lacking across most, if not all, colonial projects. 
Movements ranging from Gandhi’s non-violence to Ho Chi Minh’s pro-indepen-
dence struggle; or even large-scale protests that pre-dated independence in Ghana, 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), and the Caribbean, were indicative of substantial popular 
discontent in spite of the arguably greater (and unique) socioeconomic benefits the 
colonial regimes had brought the colonies (Belich, 2009). Moreover, individuals often 
were not given the opportunity to choose whether they accepted the related bene-
fits—there were minimal options that would permit easy international migration, let 
along inter-regional movements for individuals to ‘opt out’ of the provided benefits.4 
Additionally, the colonised often lacked economic, cultural, and political capital to 
influence politics and determine the arrangements and shape of the ‘beneficial co-
operative schemes’ into which they were entered against their will: merely because 
they ostensibly accepted and ‘enjoyed’ the fruits of colonialism did not imply that 
they authentically consented to them. Whilst the reasons supplied here may neither 
be universally nor necessarily true, they are sufficient in illustrating that the consent-
based objection raised above is at best severely limited in its explanatory power. 
4.  For more arguments that are similar to this, cf. common objections to tactic consent arguments 
in political theory —e.g. Simmons.
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A more promising line may be ii), i.e. that it would have been rational for the colo-
nised to accept the relational injustice brought about by colonialism, in exchange for 
the allegedly substantial material benefits. This version of the objection appears at-
tractive, for it appears tentatively counterintuitive to posit that one could be wronged 
by an act that one would be maximally rational (most reasonable) in accepting and 
not rejecting. 
Yet this objection is vulnerable to the fact that it fails to block the particular intu-
itions we feel in response to the Selfish Coach, the Saviour Burglar, and the Discriminated 
Homeless Person. For instance, it appears to be (most) rational for the discriminated 
homeless person to accept the racist treatment they experience, in exchange for not 
dying (and potentially incurring substantially greater welfare losses on the whole); 
yet this mere fact does not diminish the powerful intuition that there is something 
wrong about the relation of discrimination to which the homeless person is exposed. 
Merely because an outcome is most rationally desirable does not imply that it does 
not involve a wrongdoing.5 
The underlying explanation for the particularity of the above intuitions con-
sists of the locality of relational injustice (cf. the above discussion concerning its non-
fungibility)—even if it is holistically rational for an agent to accept the occurrence of 
the wrongdoing with their own welfare in mind, the rationality does not mitigate or 
resolve the particular relation between the wrongdoer and the wronged, which stands 
independently of the wronged’s individual welfare. In other words, the wrongness 
of relational injustice is local to the relation, as opposed to being a global property 
relevant to the individual’s welfare. 
OBJECTION II: POSSIBILITY OF COMPENSATION?
The second objection to my central thesis is as follows: as it stands, it appears 
that the relational injustice account precludes the possibility of any future compen-
sation. If we are to accept that relational injustices are spatiotemporally sensitive and 
‘non-fungible’ with a wide range of material benefits, it appears that such relational 
injustices may never be offsettable by realistic practical options that wrongdoers may 
pursue in compensation. Should this be the case, this notion of wrongdoing appears 
to inherently render any form of targeted compensation futile. Whilst this by no 
5.  Consider, for instance, ‘tragic dilemmas’ in virtue ethics; whilst virtue ethics concerns the 
character, relational injustice concerns the relation.
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means undermines its internal support and consistency, an account of wrongdoing 
that does not allow for compensation seems to have limited practical value.
The first counter is meta-theoretical—merely because a theory does not serve 
to account for a particular type of action that may allegedly follow from it (e.g. com-
pensation) does not undermine the explanatory, interpretive, and analytical virtue of 
such a theory.
The second counter is a concession—it is indeed possible for an individual to 
‘accept’ material benefits in offsetting past wrongdoings involving relational injus-
tice, but this concession at most grants that the wrongdoing can be fully mitigated 
through subsequent redress, but not offset automatically by the generation of any ma-
terial benefits. In order for the compensation to not be vacuous, some initial, unoffset 
wrongs must have been committed—it is not the onus of this theory to defend the 
claim that it is never possible to compensate for past relational injustices, but merely 
that it requires a substantially high threshold in order to do so. Whilst it is beyond the 
scope to discuss the following in detail, I would suggest that an adequate theory per-
taining to acceptable compensation for relational injustice must involve: i) relational 
equalisation—the formation of a relationship that constitutes parity and no power 
asymmetries; ii) acceptance—both parties must view the compensation (in whatever 
form it may take) as a genuine and adequate compensation pertaining to the relation-
al injustice, and iii) appropriate intentions—the wrongdoer must possess appropriate 
intentions that reflect genuine desire to compensate: for example, the racist shelter 
manager cannot pay the homeless with the primary (ulterior) motive of preventing 
an ignominious expose: the compensatory move must be accompanied by genuinely 
apologetic intentions.6
OBJECTION III: THE QUASI-PARFITIAN REGRETS TEST
A further objection is quasi-Parfitian7: it reasons that it would be erroneous 
to hold that a person is wronged by an injustice if the person would not have been 
better off in comparison, even had the injustice not occurred. More specifically, as-
suming that when we posit that something is wrong we are also making the claim 
6.  These conditions appear to be rather demanding; one may correctly ponder if they must also 
obtain as general conditions for compensation for past wrongs across all cases. One potential reason 
why they apply particularly strongly to the context of relational injustice is the unique role played by 
authentic intentions and relational parity within the discursive sphere of relational equality. 
7.  cf. Parfit’s response to rights-based solutions to the Non-Identity Problem in Parfit, 1984
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that something is regrettable, to regret something that is comparatively better for one 
appears to be unintelligible. Note here that the metaphysical assumption is that in the 
absence of relational inequality afflicting them, colonised individuals would not have 
acquired the material gains and welfare improvements, either because they would 
not have existed in the first place, or because the outcomes very well could have been 
worse.8 As such, it would be unreasonable for the colonised to regret colonialism, 
without also regretting the comparative benefits they derived from the process.
Note the distinction between harm (a comparative concept) and wrong (a non-
comparative concept). This objection assumes that the relevant metric is reasonable 
regrettability, but neglects whether regrettability maps onto the concept of harm, or 
wrong. I suggest that it maps onto only the former—for we may find something wrong 
without wishing that it had not happened. The homeowner and athlete may find the 
burglar and their coach having wronged them, whilst simultaneously being content 
with the burglary and training they received. Furthermore, it is also deeply unclear 
as to why individuals cannot regret particular events, even if they do introduce (inci-
dental) net benefits to them—for instance, a person who wins a lottery after undergo-
ing an agonising surgery may have derived more benefit on the whole, but may still 
(retrospectively) wish that the surgery had not occurred, because the pain accrued 
from the surgery is non-commensurate with the 10,000GBP they subsequently win.
Most fundamentally, Parfit’s regrets test could be turned upon the argument—
perhaps it is the (non-necessary) entailment between the wrong-making feature (e.g. 
the break-in, the harsh training, and the relational injustice under colonialism) and 
the welfare improvements that is most reasonable to regret: after all, it is not in-
conceivable for there to be a possible world where individuals’ welfare is benefited 
without the preceding acts of relational injustice. A possible world where the entail-
ment between the two does not obtain is one that is not only clearly conceivable, but 
also potentially relatively proximate to this world. The upshot is that the colonised 
can regret the relational inequality they experience without regretting the benefits 
they accrue ‘as a result’ of the relational inequality.9
In conclusion, the concept of relational injustice offers a useful avenue to ac-
counting for the wrongness of empires independent of counterfactual-based disputes 
8.  cf. the ‘fragility’ assumption underpinning most versions of the Non-Identity Problem —i.e. a 
slight change in events could result in substantial changes to future events, which produce individu-
als with completely distinct de re identities.
9.  Let us not diverge into the interesting but ultimately orthogonal discussion of how causation 
ought to be interpreted.
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over colonialism’s impact on individual welfare. Even if colonies had become more 
prosperous under colonisation, this offers no recuse for the errors of empires past. 
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